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IN THE UTAH COUR'i . APPEALS 
THE STATE OF fTTAII, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I Case No. 9700565-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
because is an appeal from a court 
involving a convictior ? a first-degree or capital felony. Utah 
i-M,lr • (1996). 
ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION 
Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in failing to al1ow 
Defendant withdraw his plea on the grounds of breach of the plea 
agreement? 
The standard of review for denial of a motion to withdraw a 
whether if clearly appears that the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing cause. 
Gentry, 797 P.2d 456 (Utah it A. _• 1990). 
1111" ti P ill. .i' ill1!11 i preserved for appeal by virtue o* 
Defendant's oral Motion Withdraw Guilty Plea. (Transci 
September 8, 1997, hearing [hereinafter "9/8/97 Tr.lf] 15.) 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIE3 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of the Court. Utah Code Ann., § 
77-13-6(2)(a) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal action against Defendant for Theft, a 
Class-A Misdemeanor. 
R. Course of the Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Defendant was 
charged under an Amended Information for Theft, a Class-A 
Misdemeanor, arising from the alleged theft of a motor vehicle. 
Such plea was entered on or about July 21, 1997. At the time of 
sentencing on September 8, 1997, after various comments made by 
counsel for the Plaintiff, which Defendant believed to be a breach 
of the plea agreement, Defendant orally moved to withdraw his plea 
of guilty. Although the lower Court initially granted Defendant's 
motion and set the matter for trial, upon request of the State, the 
lower Court reconsidered its decision. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
At an evidentiary hearing on September 16, 1997, the 
lower Court ultimately denied the motion to withdraw plea and 
entered judgment against Defendant and sentenced him to serve a 
2 
term of ninety (90) days in the Iron County Jail,1 
D. Statement of Facts 
On July 21, 1997, Defendant entered into a plea bargain 
agreement with the State of Utah whereby he pled guilty to Theft, 
a Class A Misdemeanor. A written "Statement of Defendant Regarding 
Guilty Plea, Certificates of Counsel and Order" (hereinafter "plea 
agreement") was prepared, executed by all the parties and filed 
with the Court. The matter, after obtaining a Pre-sentence 
Investigation Report, was set for sentencing on September 8, 1997. 
(R. 66-72). 
Paragraph 11 of the plea agreement provides, inter alia, 
that "the State of Utah has agreed to make no recommendations 
regarding sentencing (i.e. to submit the matter to the Court 
without comment)." (R. 69). 
At the time of sentencing on September 8, 1997, counsel 
for the State of Utah made certain comments to the Court about the 
length of jail time that would be appropriate, as well as whether 
Defendant should be allowed a furlough before reporting for his 
term of incarceration pursuant to the sentence the Court had 
imposed. At that time, Defendant asked to withdraw his plea of 
guilty by virtue of the Statefs breach of the plea agreement, and 
the Court granted his motion. The matter was then set for trial 
for December 4, 1997. (9/8/98 Tr. 6-8, 13-15). 
Although, arguably, this appeal is moot since the ninety (90) 
day term of incarceration has now been served, as a result of his 
conviction of the above offense, Defendant was found to have 
violated his probation on other felony offenses and, as a result, 
was committed to the Utah State Prison, where he remains. 
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Subsequent to the court hearing, counsel for the State 
was successful in bringing the matter again before the Court who 
agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding whether a 
withdrawal of plea on the oral motion was appropriate. (9/8/98 Tr. 
20-23) . 
At the evidentiary hearing, upon reviewing the videotape 
of the 9/8/98 hearing, the Court found that the Defendants request 
for time to report for sentencing did not relate to the sentence of 
the Court and that comments about the length of jail time to be 
served was merely a clarification and not intended to prejudice the 
Defendant. (Transcript of September 16, 1997 hearing 13-16). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The State's counsel clearly made comments regarding 
the appropriate term of incarceration for Defendant and regarding 
whether he should be granted a furlough prior to reporting for his 
term of incarceration. Both such comments materially breached the 
plea agreement, and it was an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court not to find that such breach constituted good cause for 
Defendant to withdraw his plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE STATE BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT, 
THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
As a general rule, the lower court has discretion whether 
to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Gentry, 797 
P.2d 456, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Vasilacopulos, 946 
4 
P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Gentry this Court held that 
if the Court fails to find good cause where such good cause exists, 
it has abused its discretion. Gentry, 797 P.2d at 457. Moreover, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that in exercising such discretion, 
the courts should, in general, "liberally" grant motions to 
withdraw pleas. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 
1987). See also Santobello V. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 268 (1971). 
Specifically, the Gallegos court stated as follows: 
The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of 
several important constitutional rights, including the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront 
witness. Because the entry of such a plea constitutes 
such a waiver, and because the prosecution will generally 
be unable to show that it will suffer any significant 
prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a presentence motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be 
liberally granted. 
Id., at 1041-42 (footnote omitted). 
The appellate courts of this State have yet to determine 
whether a breach of a written plea agreement by the State 
constitute constitutes good cause to withdraw a plea. However, the 
lower Court apparently determined that such was good cause when it 
initially granted Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court of 
Maryland, in a case factually similar to the case at bar, has 
likewise held that if a prosecutor agrees to make no 
recommendations as to sentence and then violates that agreement, 
the Defendant may have his guilty plea vacated. Miller v. State, 
272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527, 530 (1974). See also Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 262; Darnell v. Timpani, 68 Wash.2d 666, 414 P.2d 782, 783-
84 (1966). Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 
5 
A.2d 526, 529 (1971), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a 
promise to make no comment or recommendation at sentencing means a 
"commitment not to make any damning or even potentially damaging 
statements at the time of sentencing." 
In the instant case, the State has failed to show any 
prejudice that would result if Defendant were allowed to withdraw 
his plea. Any delay in trial affects Defendant equally as much as 
the State.2 The State, in its plea agreement, agreed to make no 
comment whatsoever at the time of sentencing. Instead, it 
commented both on the way jail time should be calculated (which 
could result in prejudice to Defendant by serving additional time) 
and by further objecting to a furlough prior to the commitment of 
Defendant. 
Any attempts by the State to "clarify" when time should be 
computed for Defendants sentence constituted a "comment" regarding 
the meaning of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and was at 
least potentially damaging to Defendants position at sentencing. 
The State will likely argue that a delay in commencement of 
the commitment in no way affected the sentencing, because the Court 
had already imposed its sentence, and it was merely a question of 
when such sentence would commence. The date the sentence would 
commence was of importance to Defendant, however, because it would 
allow him to handle financial and other matters that he would not 
defendant1s motion may have been untimely under Section 77-
13-6(2) (b) in that it was not made within thirty days of the entry 
of his plea; however, such untimeliness, if any, was not raised by 
the State and, therefore, should not be considered by this Court. 
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 475-76 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
6 
be able to handle it the commitment were to commence immediately. 
(9/8/97 Tr. 5-6). In summary, then, an immediate commitment would 
have imposed a greater "punishment" on Defendant than if the 
temporary furlough were allowed. Thus, the lower Court's finding 
that the State's arguments in support of its objection to the 
furlough were harmless and did not affect the "sentence", were 
unfounded. 
Giving Defendant the benefit of the doubt, and based upon 
the holding in Gallegos, the lower Court should have liberally 
construed the plea agreement and found a breach thereof. 
Accordingly, it should have found that such breach constituted good 
cause and allowed Defendant to withdraw his plea* 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this Court should 
reverse the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of the lower Court 
and remand for the purposes of entry of a not-guilty plea so that 
the matter can proceed to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j£^5^day of May, 1998. 
7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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ADDENDUM 
9 
SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
REGARDING GUILTY PLEA, 
CERTIFICATES OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
) Criminal No. 971500112 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING GUILTY PLEA 
I, ROBERT EDGAR FRJJS, the above-named Defendant, under oath, hereby acknowledge 
that I have entered a plea of guilty to the offense of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, contained in 
the Amended Information on file against me in the above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have 
received and read, and I understand the nature of the elements of the offense for which I am pleading 
guilty. I further understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is a class A 
misdemeanor, and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and of my own free will after conferring 
with my attorney, Floyd W Holm, and with the knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have constitutional rights under the Constitution of Utah and the United 
States to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I have entered a plea of 
guilty, or to a trial by the Court should I elect to waive a trial by jury. I know I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by Floyd W Holm. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial in Court upon the charge, I have a right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against me by having them testify in open court in my presence and 
before the Court and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I 
also know that I have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State at its expense to testify in 
Court upon my behalf and that I could, if I elected to do so, testify in Court on my own behalf, and 
that if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this may not be held against me if I 
choose to have the jury so instructed. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the State must prove each and every element 
of the crime charged to the satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that I would 
have no obligation to offer any evidence myself; and that any verdict rendered by a jury, whether 
it be that of guilty or not guilty, must be by a unanimous agreement of jurors. 
4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of the United States that I have a 
right against self-incrimination or a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify 
in Court upon trial unless I choose to do so. 
5. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury 
or by the Court that I would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court 
of Utah for review of the trial proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs ior such 
appeal, that those costs would be paid by the State without cost to me, and to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal. 
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6. I know that it 1 wish to contest the charge against me, I need only plead "not guilty" 
and the matter will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous. I know and understand that by entering this plea of guilty, I am waiving my 
constitutional rights as set out in the preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully incriminating 
myself by admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I know that under the laws of Utah the possible maximum sentence that can and may 
be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the charge identified on page one of this Statement, and as set 
out in the Amended Information, is as follows: 
(A) Incarceration in the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility for a period 
not to exceed one (1) year; and 
(B) Fined in any amount not in excess of two thousand five hundred 
dollars ($2,500), plus an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge; 
I further understand that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my piea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another 
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. I also know that I may be ordered 
by the Court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my crime. 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty does not mean that the Court 
will not impose either a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made 
to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead guilty or that it will be made lighter 
because of my guilty plea. 
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9. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me 
to plead guilty, and no promises, except those contained herein, have been made to me. I know that 
any opinions made to me, by my attorney or other persons, as to what he or they believe the Court 
may do with respect to sentencing are not binding on the Court. 
10. I know that under the laws of Utah should I desire to move the Court to set aside my 
guilty plea entered in this case, I must do so within thirty (30) days of the entry of the plea or my 
right to do so will be lost. I further understand that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn only upon a 
showing of good cause and with permission of the Court. 
11. No promises of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty except that I 
have been told that if I do plead guilty, the State has agreed to file an Amended Information therein 
charging me with THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, as opposed to the original charges of 
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony; DUI, a Class B Misdemeanor; and 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor. Moreover, I am aware that 
the State of Utah has agreed to make no recommendations regarding sentencing (i.e. to submit the 
matter to the Court without comment). No other promises have been made. I am also aware that 
any charge or sentencing concessions or recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, 
including a reduction of the charge for sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor are not binding on the Court and may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
Statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
13. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
14. I am years of age, I have attended school through the grade, and I can 
read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not presently under the influence 
of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants. 
15. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
my plea. 
16. I have discussed the contents of this Statement with my attorney and ask the Court 
to accept my plea of guilty to the charge set forth in this Statement because I did, in fact, on or about 
February 3,1997, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly and intentionally exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of another (Crestview Cadillac), said property having a value in excess of 
$300. 
DATED this M^ day of July, 1997. 
_M 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, the Defendant named above, 
and I know he has read the Statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and 
believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing 
Statement, are accurate and true. 
Is, 
FLOYDWHOLM 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against ROBERT EDGAR 
FRIIS, Defendant. I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the declarations, 
including the elements of the offense and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct 
which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercions 
to encourage a plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in this Statement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the Defendant for the offense for which the 
plea is entered and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. Finally, I have discussed 
the terms of this agreement with the victim and the investigating agency in this case, and said victim 
and agency folly support and agree with said plea agreement. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
- 6 -
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement of Defendant Regarding Guilty Plea 
and the foregoing Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendants plea of guilty is freely and 
voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that Defendant ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS' plea of "guilty" to 
the charge set forth in the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before me this _ .day 
of July, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. PHILIP EVES 
District Court Judge 
- 7 -
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal No. 971500112 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, having enteicd a plea of guilty io the offense of 
THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, on July 21,1997, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty 
and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report prior to 
sentencing, and upon completion of said report, the above-entitled mater having been called on for 
sentencing on September 8,1997, in Parowan, Utah, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, and the 
above-named Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, having appeared before the Court in person 
together with his attorney of record, Floyd W Holm, and the State of Utah having appeared by and 
tlirough iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and the Court having reviewed the presentence 
investigation report and having further reviewed the file in detail, and thereafter having heard 
statements from the Defendant and his attorney, and the Court being fiilly advised in the premises 
now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROBERT 
EDGAR FRJJS, has been convicted of the offense of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, and the Court 
having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is 
adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRHS, and pursuant to 
his conviction of THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of incarceration 
for a period of ninety (90) days, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Iron 
County Sheriff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall commence serving the term of 
incarceration set forth above (90 days) on September 19,1997, at 9:00 a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine and no restitution shall be imposed by the Court. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROBERT EDGAR FRIIS, and 
deliver him to the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept 
and confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this c*-* w day of September, 1997. 
J^ PHILIP EVES 
District Court Judge 
- 2 -
